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8 per cent per annum; loans by non-licensees of less than $300.00 at
more than 8 per cent per annum), and (2) the statute is a police regu-
lation, State v. Powers, 125 Ohio St. io8, ISo N.E. 647 (932);
People v. Stokes, supra; aimed at the protection of the small borrower
which should include the "economically absurd luxury" of litigation as
well as usury. It would not, under the circumstances, seem to be too
harsh to require purchasers of such paper from licensees to inquire as to
its validity. Finally General Code section 8307 was probably never
intended to be applied to void instruments. Extended search fails to
show a single occasion where it has been invoked to save the holder of
a void instrument. The fact that the indorsee is not a party to the illegal
transaction carries no weight. General Code section 8307 specifically
declares the victim of usury not a particeps criminis. The indorsee seeks
to invoke a part of the Interest Law to give life to an instrument declared
void by the legislature as a police measure. It is hard to believe that the
legislature would have intended to have this police measure circum-
vented by mere indorsement to a bona fide purchaser.
J. GARETH HrrcHcoCc
PLEADING
ELECTION OF REMEDIES - MASTER-SERVANT RELATIONSHIP
The plaintiff brought an action against the defendant on the theory
of respondeat superior for injuries received in an automobile accident
caused by the negligence of the defendant's servant. While the action
was pending, the plaintiff filed an action directly against the servant.
Service was had but no answer was filed and the case went to default
judgment. The court, upon motion, dismissed the suit against the
master on the ground that the plaintiff's judgment against the servant
constituted an election of his remedies and was a bar to his recovery
against the master. On appeal it was held that the granting of such
motion was error. In refusing to require election, the court said that
the plaintiff had two consistent substantial remedies which are not repug-
nant to each other and he might pursue each separately, that is, he
might pursue the master and he might pursue the servant separately but
he can have only one satisfaction. Land v. Berzin, 26 Ohio L. Abs.
703 (1938).
The doctrine of election of remedies may be broadly defined as a
choice made with knowledge between two inconsistent substantial rights,
either of which may be instituted at the instance of the chooser, who
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cannot, however, enjoy both. Frederickson v. Nye, I Io Ohio St. 459,
144 N.E. 299, 35 A.L.R. 1163 (1924). In a jurisdiction applying
the doctrine of election of remedies, if the remedies are inconsistent,
the plaintiff logically should be required to elect and having done so,
would be barred in a subsequent action against the master. But if the
remedies are consistent, there is no room for the application of the
doctrine. The doctrine of election of remedies does not apply where the
proceedings are against different persons and are consistent. Herd v.
Wade, 63 S.W. (2d) 253 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); Maple v. Rail-
road, 40 Ohio St. 313,48 Am. Rep. 685 (1883). The same rules apply
to joinder. Joinder of inconsistent causes of actions cannot be permitted
in the same petition. Therefore, if the plaintiff's remedies against the
master and servant are inconsistent, joinder should not be had. But if
they are consistent, there is no reason for not permitting a joint action.
Byers v. Rivers, 3 Ohio Dec. Rep. 231 (186o); i Ohio Jur. p. 351.
There is a conflict in the cases as to whether or not the plaintiff's
remedy against the master and his remedy against the servant are con-
sistent. The Vermont Supreme Court has gone a long way in advocat-
ing the inconsistency of the plaintiff's remedies. In a case decided in
1935 it was held that where the master is liable under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, he and his servant are not joint tortfeasors, hence
are liable jointly but in the alternative. They may not be joined as
defendants and the plaintiff's election to sue the servant bars him from
the proceeding against the master. The court, as indicated in the above
statement,, based its decision on the theory that the vicarious liability of
the master is only a substituted or alternative one which cannot exist
concurrently with that of a servant. This case represents the view that
the plaintiff's remedies are inconsistent and naturally joinder is refused
and the doctrine of election of remedies is applied. Raymond v. Capo-
bianco, 107 Vt. 295, 178 Atl. 896 (1935). The decision of the case
has been severely criticized. 45 Yale L. J. 920 (1936); 36 Col. Law
Rev. 324 (1936). Some of the Ohio cases have adopted the theory of
the Raymond case, supra. In Ohio a joint action cannot be maintained
against the master and servant because, it is said, the master's liability
arises solely from the relationship between them, under the doctrine of
respondeat superior, and not by reason of the master's personal partici-
pation in the wrongful or negligent act. Under such circumstances,
since the remedies are viewed as inconsistent, the plaintiff is required to
elect against which of the defendants he wil proceed. Clark v. Fry,
8 Ohio St. 358, 72 Am. Dec. 590 (1858); French v. Central Con-
struction Co., 8 Ohio C.C. (N.S.) 425, 18 Ohio C.D. 524 (i9o6);
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French v. Central Construction Co., 76 Ohio St. 509, 81 N.E. 751,
12 L.R.A. (N.S.) 669 (1907); 26 Ohio Jur. p. 671. A judgment
against the servant whom the plaintiff, with knowledge of the master-
servant relationship, has elected to sue may be pleaded in bar to his
subsequent action against the master. Cordes v. Deopke, i Ohio N.P.
(N.S.) 561 (1917).
Under the codes, however, a large majority of the states have
adopted a different theory. They hold that the remedies are consistent
and that the plaintiff may join the master and servant in an action where
the master is liable only under the doctrine of respondeat superior. 98
A.L.R. 1057 (935); 39 C.J., p. 1314; MECHEM, AGENCY, p. 158o
(1914). There is some authority in Ohio to the effect that the rem-
edies are consistent, even though joinder is denied. The Ohio Supreme
Court refused to apply the doctrine of election of remedies in a case
where a judgment was taken against an agent for fraud committed
while acting within the scope of his agency but upon which no satisfaction
was had. The court held that such judgment was no bar to a subse-
quent action against the principal for the same fraud. Maple v. Rail-
road, supra; MECHEM, AGENCY, p. 1586 (1914). Such a decision indi-
cates a belief on the part of the court that the remedies are consistent.
In a more recent court of appeals case there is dictum to the effect that
the plaintiff's remedies are consistent. Schulz v. Brunhoff Mfg. Co.,
22 Ohio App. 220, 225, 153 N.E. 924, 926 (1926).
What are the arguments generally advanced by those advocating
the inconsistency of the remedies of the plaintiff against the master and
servant where the master is liable solely because of the master-servant
relationship? One which could be used is by way of analogy. In con-
tract cases where the plaintiff, with knowledge of the existence of the
principal, and with the power to choose between him and the agent,
takes a judgment against either one, that constitutes a conclusive deter-
mination to hold that one only. Mechem, Agency, p. 1320 (1914).
One might say, by analogy, that such reasoning should also apply to tort
actions. But the law is otherwise; in contract cases the rule is more
one of substantive law than of procedure. In tort cases, following the
general rule respecting joint wrongdoers, it is held that an unsatisfied
judgment against the agent is no bar to a subsequent proceeding against
the principal. Maple v. Railroad, supra; Mechem, Agency, p. 1586
(1914). Probably the real basis for the belief that the remedies are
inconsistent lies in the old common law rules of pleading which would
not permit the joinder of actions in trespass with actions in case. An
action against the servant was in trespass and an action against the master
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was in case, therefore joinder was denied. Such an argument is out-
dated and has no place in modern code procedure. It is no reason to
deny joinder and find the remedies inconsistent simply because such was
the case at common law. 98 A.L.R. 1058 (1935). The reason given
in Ohio for finding the remedies inconsistent and denying joinder is
that the master has a right against the servant for recovery of such
damages as he may be compelled to pay by reason of the servant's negli-
gence. Clark v. Fry, sup-a; 15 Ohio Jur. p. 289. The reason seems
to be a poor one when it is recognized that the master's liability is really
in the nature of a surety, although a non-consensual one. In a suit on
a suretyship contract the principal and the surety may be joined in the
same action even though the surety has the right of indemnity for pay-
ment against his principal. 38 Ohio Jur. p. 478.
What are the arguments advanced by those advocating the con-
sistency of the plaintiff's remedies? It seems that the courts which allow
joinder and refuse to require the plaintiff to elect do so simply because
it is in harmony with the paramount idea of the codes, namely, to litigate
all causes which may legitimately be joined, in order to avoid a multi-
plicity of actions. The master and servant are liable to the plaintiff for
the same wrongful or negligent act; and if the master personally partici-
pated in the act, directed it or ratified it, they clearly would be joint
tortfeasors; the remedies would be viewed as consistent and joinder
would be permitted in almost all jurisdictions. 39 C.J. p. 1315; Me-
chem,zAgency, p. I58o (1914). Such is the rule in Ohio. French v.
Central Construction Co., supra; Tishler v. Taxicabs of Cincinnati, Inc.,
ii Ohio Op. 17, 26 Ohio Abs. (1938); 30 Ohio Jur., p. 775- In a
case where the master is liable to the plaintiff for the act of the servant
because of the master-servant relationship and not because he concurred
in the wrongful or negligent act, there is no merit in the argument that
the remedies become inconsistent and should not be joined. To draw
such a distinction is not justified. The purpose of the codes is to facili-
tate pleading and get away from technical rules which can result in
nothing but injustice to a party who has been injured. Furthermore,
it is difficult to imagine how the defendant master could be prejudiced
or caught by surprise simply because joinder was permitted and the
election of remedies denied application.
In conclusion, it seems dear that the more sensible theory and the
one adopted in most jurisdictions is that the remedies are consistent.
It would follow that joinder should be permitted and the doctrine of
election of remedies denied application. But what is the state of the
law in Ohio? Where the master is liable solely because of the master-
servant relationship, do the courts of Ohio consider the plaintiff's rem-
edies against the servant and against the master as being consistent or as
being inconsistent? The answer to that question seems to be that the
Ohio cases are in a state of confusion. There is one line of cases which
refuses joinder of master afid servant and requires election of remedies
on the theory that the plaintiff's remedies are inconsistent. Clark v. Fry,
supra; French v. Central Construction Co., supra; Cordes v. Deopke,
supra. Another line of cases recognizes that the remedies are consistent,
and even though joinder cannot be permitted because of contrary prece-
dent, the application of the doctrine of election of remedies is denied.
Maple v. Railroad, supra; Schultz v. Brunhoff Mfg. Co., supra;
L'Archcr v. Rosenberger, 3 Ohio Op. 101, 103 (1935); Land v.
Berzin, supra, the'principal case. The holding of the principal case, as
indicated, follows the theory of the latter group of cases recognizing the
consistency of the remedies. In light of the foregoing discussion, such a
holding is to be commended. Where one rule prohibited joinder and
another rule required election of remedies, a situation would be created
whereby the chances of the plaintiff's recovery would be largely deter-
mined by the application of technical procedural rules. It is the group
of cases finding the remedies consistent and refusing to apply the doctrine
of election of remedies which saved the Ohio law from getting into such
a predicament. The solution to the problem, of course, lies in the abro-
gation of both the rule against joinder and the doctrine of election of
remedies in master-servant situations. It is hoped that the supreme court
will see fit not only to affirm the rule laid down in the principal case,
but also to overrule the cases which have refused joinder.
PHILIP AULTMAN
ALTERNATIVE PLEADING IN OHIO
In an action founded on the breach of a contract to lease property,
plaintiff's prayer was that the court decree specific performance or alter-
natively, if equitable relief should be denied, award damages in lieu
thereof. The trial court found the plaintiff disentitled to specific per-
formance because of laches but assessed damages in his favor. Neither
party at this first trial requested a jury. On appeal the judgment relative
to laches and the right to specific performance was affirmed, but the
case was reversed and remanded because of the application of an improper
measure of damages. The court denied defendant's request for a jury
made early in the second trial stating as its reason "the equitable rule
that where a court of equity has once acquired jurisdiction, it will retain
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